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Not all disputes require the imposition of an outcome by the courts for 
their resolution. Even after litigation has begun, the parties may instead 
reach some form of compromise. This is very common, and there are 
various reasons why it might happen. Perhaps a case that initially seemed 
strong now appears, after further reflection or on the emergence of new 
information, somewhat weaker. Litigation is often an expensive and 
protracted business, with no certainty as to outcome, and even a party 
confident of ultimate success may prefer to compromise rather than take 
the risk of losing all. Alternatively, a negotiated agreement may be less 
harmful to an ongoing relationship than contentious court proceedings 
would be.  
A compromise agreement is a form of contract, binding the parties 
to disposal of the matters at issue in a particular way. As is well known, 
most forms of contract have no special formal requirements for their 
constitution. Most contracts can be formed orally, and are fully binding 
without the use of writing. Of course, it is sensible to record important 
agreements in writing, but that is for ease of proof of what has been 
agreed. Assuming proof is possible, lack of writing is no obstacle to 
enforceability. 
 There are exceptions, however. Certain forms of contract require 
writing for their valid constitution. An example is a contract for the 
transfer of ownership of land. In such cases, writing is not just used for 
the purpose of proving the existence and terms of the agreement. 
Instead, an oral agreement for the sale of land will be entirely 
unenforceable, regardless of how convincing the evidence that may be 
brought to bear in its proof. This is subject only to the statutory personal 
bar contained in s. 1(3) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 
1995 ("the 1995 Act"), but that is limited in its scope, and so is only of 
assistance in restricted circumstances. 
 The question has sometimes arisen whether a compromise 
agreement concerning heritable property requires writing for its valid 
constitution. The point is disputed in the literature. On one hand, Gloag 
(The Law of Contract (2nd edn, 1929), p. 164) has said that the Court: 
 
"has refused to apply its rules [i.e. the rules requiring writing for 
contracts involving heritage] to contracts of a complicated character 
where some right to heritage is incidentally involved. Thus the 
compromise of an action, though relating to heritage, does not 
require a probative writing." 
 
By contrast, for Walker, the category of contracts requiring writing 
includes "compromise agreements, one of the terms of which is an 
agreement which requires to be constituted in probative writing" (The Law 
of Contracts and Related Obligations in Scots Law (3rd edn, 1995), para 
13.23). 
Although both of these predate the 1995 Act, that Act does not 
expressly resolve the issue. The question has arisen once more in a recent 
sheriff court case. 
In DWS v RMS [2016] SC GRE 47, the parties were spouses 
engaged in an action for divorce. The matrimonial property included the 
matrimonial home and also certain investment properties. The parties had 
been attempting for an extended period to agree a fair division of this 
matrimonial property. A proposal was made by the pursuer's agent that 
the defender (the wife) would convey to the pursuer her interest in the 
investment properties. In exchange, the pursuer would convey to her his 
interest in the matrimonial home. The defender would arrange for the 
pursuer to be released from the debt secured on the matrimonial home. 
This, of course, is on the face of it a perfectly acceptable agreement 
in law. However, the letter containing the proposal contained the following 
words: "We also insist on agreeing a reasonable timescale for [the 
pursuer's] release. At this stage [the pursuer] is willing to remain on the 
mortgage product for at least twelve months or so and possibly longer." 
No final agreement was reached on timescales. For this reason, the sheriff 
held that there was no binding compromise agreement. 
On this point, the sheriff seems clearly correct. A term of "twelve 
months or so and possibly longer" is hopelessly vague, and clearly 
represents a negotiating position rather than anything capable of being 
construed as a binding obligation, even if agreed to. Something more 
precise is required before the defender can know what it is that she is 
obliged to do. 
However, there was a preliminary point, with which this article is 
concerned. The agreement, such as it was, was never reduced to formal 
writing. Accordingly, the defender argued that, because it concerned 




The defender's argument was straightforward in its essentials. In terms of 
s. 1(2)(a)(i) of the 1995 Act (incorrectly cited at para [5] of the sheriff's 
opinion as "section 1 and section 2(a)(i)"), writing is required for the 
constitution of "a contract or unilateral obligation for the creation, 
transfer, variation or extinction of a real right in land". This, as mentioned 
above, is an exception to the general principle that writing is not required 
for the constitution of a contract. The 1995 Act goes on to provide for the 
required form of such writing. These requirements are not onerous: 
certainly they are less onerous than the previous law. In brief, a 
document is formally valid for these purposes if subscribed by the granter 
(i.e. signed at the end of the last page). Onerous or not, though, the 
requirements of the 1995 Act were not complied with. No issue of 
personal bar was raised, and no such argument would seem available on 
the facts. Accordingly, argued the defender, even if there was sufficient 
agreement for a valid contract, there was in fact no such contract because 
it was not in writing. 
 The sheriff, however, rejected this argument. For reasons that will 
be discussed below, the sheriff held that a contract for the compromise of 
an action did not require writing for its valid constitution, even when 
concerned with heritable property. 
 Discussion 
 
The sheriff's decision in DWS v RMS may be criticised on two grounds: 
first, it is inconsistent with principle; and, second, it is inconsistent with 
earlier binding authority. 
 
(i) The argument from principle 
 
It is clear enough that writing is not required for an agreement just 
because it involves heritable property in some way. Some contracts affect 
land only incidentally, for example. The rules in the 1995 Act, as were the 
previous rules, are more precise than simply "all agreements concerned 
with heritable property need formal writing". Instead, as we have seen, 
writing is required for the constitution of "a contract or unilateral 
obligation for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of a real right 
in land". Many contracts will have some relationship with heritable 
property without falling into that category. 
 With that in mind, it may be helpful to consider what compromise 
agreements actually do. Two possibilities may be identified. First, a 
compromise agreement may simply be an agreement of what the parties' 
rights currently are. For example, suppose that P raises an action against 
D for declarator that a particular area of ground belongs to P. If the 
parties enter into a compromise agreement in which D concedes that P's 
case is well-founded, then ex hypothesi no "creation, transfer, variation or 
extinction of a real right in land" is involved. The agreement does not 
envisage P becoming owner of the land in accordance with its terms. 
Instead, the agreement recognises that P is already owner. The 1995 Act 
would therefore not appear to require writing for such a compromise 
agreement. 
 Second, the compromise agreement may in some way regulate the 
parties' rights in heritable property anew. For instance, suppose that P 
and D are co-owners of an area of land. P raises an action for division and 
sale of the land. A compromise agreement is then entered into whereby a 
division of the land between the parties is agreed. Here new rights are 
created. It is envisaged that P and D will go from being co-owners of the 
whole of the land to being respective sole owners of two separate areas of 
land. To bring this about, P must convey to D a pro indiviso share of one 
part of the land and D must convey to P a pro indiviso share of the 
remainder. Thus, new rights are created by the compromise agreement 
that did not exist before. 
 For the purposes of this article, we may call these two forms of 
compromise agreement respectively type 1 and type 2 compromises. A 
type 1 compromise agreement recognises existing rights; a type 2 
compromise agreement creates new rights or varies existing rights. Of 
course, in practice many compromise agreements will be a mix of the two. 
For example, a compromise that recognises the pursuer's ownership of an 
area of land (type 1) may also make provision about liability for expenses 
of the action (type 2). Some compromises may also be difficult to classify. 
For example, suppose P and D, owners of neighbouring areas of land, are 
in dispute about the precise location of the boundary. A compromise is 
reached whereby it is agreed that the current boundary is on a particular 
line. To remove the possibility of dispute in the future, the parties are to 
execute an appropriate conveyance in each other's favour. On the face of 
it, this is a type 1 compromise, as it is an agreement as to the current 
position. Nonetheless, it must be given practical effect by formal 
conveyance, which looks like type 2. Nonetheless, the distinction seems 
sound in principle. 
 Assuming that this distinction can in principle be made, the 
important point for these purposes is the part of the compromise that is 
concerned with land, as that is where the dispute lies. On no view of 
things is an agreement on the expenses of litigation, for example, 
required to be in writing. 
 To illustrate the distinction, we may consider Anderson v Dick 
(1901) 4 F 68, one of the cases cited by Gloag in support of the statement 
quoted above. In that case, D was the feudal superior of land held by A. D 
raised an action against A for declarator of irritancy and for arrears of 
feuduty. A's agents wrote to D's agents offering to consent to decree in 
the action for irritancy, on the basis that D would not seek expenses. This 
offer was accepted by letter from D's agents. Neither letter complied with 
the requirements for formal writing applicable under the law at the time 
(although, as they were subscribed by the respective agents, they would 
appear sufficient under the current law). Nonetheless, the Inner House 
held that the action had been effectively compromised. This, though, 
appears to have been a type 1 compromise. The irritancy had already 
been incurred. The agreement was in its terms merely recognition of that 
fact. D was not thereby granted any new right that he did not already 
have. On the argument presented here, therefore, formal writing would 
not be required. 
 By contrast, the alleged compromise agreement in DWS v RMS 
appears to be a type 2 compromise. The current ownership of the 
matrimonial home and of the investment properties was not in dispute. 
Instead, the alleged agreement was one creating a personal right in 
favour of each of the parties to become owner of heritable property 
belonging to the other. Those rights owed their existence to nothing other 
than the contract of compromise between the parties. The compromise, in 
other words, created new rights rather than simply expressing an agreed 
position on what those rights were already. The question then is whether 
a compromise agreement of this type requires writing for its constitution. 
The sheriff held that it did not. To see why the sheriff came to this view, 
we need to consider the sheriff's reasoning. 
The sheriff considered (para [23]) that the question of law for 
decision was "whether a compromise agreement relating to heritage 
constitutes a 'contract...for the...transfer of a real right in land'." The text 
quoted by the sheriff is from the 1995 Act. As we have seen, contracts for 
the transfer of a real right in land require writing; other contracts, for the 
most part, do not. 
The sheriff went on (paras [26]-[29]) to make a distinction between 
the contract of transfer, creating only personal rights; and the actual 
conveyance, transferring the real right in the property. This distinction is, 
of course, familiar from everyday conveyancing practice. The missives of 
sale give to the purchaser only a personal right to become owner; they do 
not themselves make the purchaser owner of the property. Only the 
disposition, when duly registered in the Land Register, can do that. 
This is all very familiar, but it is not clear to this writer that it takes 
the sheriff to the conclusion that he has reached. After all, the distinction 
is recognised in the 1995 Act itself, which is clear that both contract and 
conveyance require writing when heritable property is involved. In 
addition to s. 1(2)(a)(i), requiring that the contract be in writing, s. 
1(2)(b) requires writing for the "transfer...of a real right in land". 
The sheriff's conclusion (para [29]) is that a compromise 
agreement "confers only personal rights. It is therefore not a contract for 
the transfer of a real right in land." With respect, that appears to be a non 
sequitur. Creating personal rights is all a contract for transfer of heritage 
ever does (unless, which is not relevant here, it also varies or discharges 
personal rights). Missives confer personal rights, and do not under any 
circumstances alter the real rights in the property. Nonetheless, it is 
accepted beyond any possibility of dispute that missives of sale constitute 
"a contract for the transfer of a real right in land". 
 The compromise agreement alleged to exist in DWS v RMS is a 
contract, by which each party is given a personal right against the other, 
requiring that other to transfer a right of co-ownership of land. It is not 
easy to see, therefore, how such an agreement can fail to be "a 
contract...for the...transfer of a real right in land" in terms of s. 1(2)(a)(i) 
of the 1995 Act. Such an agreement ought therefore to require writing for 
the very same reason that missives for sale of land require writing. 
 The 1995 Act does not directly address the issue of compromise 
agreements, but it is not easy to see any reason why they should be 
treated differently from other contracts. Erskine, in a passage cited by the 
sheriff in DWS v RMS (Inst. 3.1.2, cited at para [28]), gives the following 
justification for the special rule requiring contracts for the transfer of land 
to be in writing: 
 
"For in the transmission of heritage, which is justly accounted of the 
greatest importance to society, parties are not to be catched by 
rash expressions, but continue free, till they have discovered their 
deliberate and final resolutions concerning it by writing." 
 
It is instructive to consider the views of the Scottish Law Commission, in 
making the recommendations that led to the 1995 Act. In its Report on 
Requirements of Writing (Scot Law Com No 112, 1988), while 
acknowledging that there are now other forms of property which have 
similar importance, the Commission argues (para 2.14) that transactions 
with heritage: 
 
"are generally still important. For most people, the purchase of 
their house is the largest, and most important, transaction they 
make in their lifetimes. There is still a strong case for a rule which 
gives parties to such a transaction time for consideration or 
reconsideration and which discourages them from concluding 
informal doorstep contracts without the benefit of legal advice." 
 
This reasoning appears to apply just as well to compromise agreements. 
While the Commission does not here directly consider compromise 
agreements, it is noteworthy that its examples of contracts not to fall 
within this rule, although relating to land, are "contracts for gardening 
services and house maintenance which relate to heritage but only 
incidentally" (para 2.16). A compromise agreement, whereby the owner of 
land agrees to convey that land to another, has much more in common 
with everyday missives of sale than it does with a contract for gardening 
services: with the former, it is only the context that differs, not the 
substance of what is being done. A compromise agreement, if imposing an 
obligation to transfer ownership of land, is doing something that would 
certainly require writing if it was not done in the context of litigation. 
There seems no obvious reason why the context of ongoing litigation 
should make any difference to the question, and no such reason appears 
in the sheriff's opinion. 
 The same points may be made about the Outer House decision in 
McFarlane v McFarlane [2007] CSOH 75, relied on by the sheriff in DWS v 
RMS (paras [26]-[27]). That case involved a compromise agreement, 
constituted orally, that required one of the parties to convey heritable 
property to the other. Proceeding on a concession by counsel, the Lord 
Ordinary held that such an agreement did not require writing. For the 
reasons already given, this decision also seems questionable. 
 
(ii) The argument from authority 
 
There is a further reason for thinking that the sheriff may have gone 
wrong in reaching the view that he did in DWS v RMS. In the course of his 
opinion, the sheriff referred to and purported to distinguish the decision of 
the Inner House in Cook v Grubb 1963 SC 1. This decision was not cited in 
McFarlane v McFarlane, the sheriff in DWS v RMS suspecting (para [26]) 
that this was because Cook "was thought to have been rendered 
irrelevant by the 1995 Act." Nonetheless, to this author at least, the 
decision in Cook appears highly relevant. 
In Cook v Grubb, the pursuer had been an employee of the 
defender. He had previously raised an action against the defender on the 
basis that the defender had negligently caused injury to him in the course 
of his employment. This previous action was compromised through an oral 
agreement, including an agreement to re-employ the pursuer in a 
different capacity. The pursuer subsequently raised an action based on an 
alleged breach of that contract of employment. 
The difficulty for the pursuer was that, according to the law as it 
stood at the time, a contract of employment for a term of more than a 
year  fell into the category of obligationes litteris and so could only be 
constituted in writing. The pursuer therefore argued that this rule did not 
apply where the employment relationship was created in a compromise 
agreement. 
Lord President Clyde, sitting in the Outer House, rejected this 
argument, holding (at pp. 7-8) that: 
 
“that new contract, whether arrived at independently or as an 
element in a compromise of some other claim, requires writ for its 
constitution...If therefore writing is necessary for the constitution of 
a right which one party seeks to enforce, that right must still be 
constituted by writ.” 
 
The pursuer reclaimed. The Inner House, though, refused the reclaiming 
motion. They did so on the straightforward ground that a contract of this 
kind required writing, and that it made no difference that it formed part of 
a compromise agreement. 
 In DWS v RMS, the sheriff held (para [18]) that Cook could “easily” 
be distinguished. This was on the basis that it related to a contract of 
service rather than a contract for the transfer of ownership of land and 
that, in any case, the category of obligationes litteris had been abolished. 
On the latter point, the sheriff is clearly enough correct. The category of 
obligationes litteris has, however, been replaced. Simply to state that that 
category has been abolished does nothing to exclude the possibility that 
the same reasoning might apply in relation to obligations required by the 
1995 Act to be constituted in writing. 
 As to the former point, it is notable that the court in Cook 
expresses itself in general terms. This is not a point specifically about 
contracts of employment. It is immaterial, therefore, that contracts of 
employment no longer require writing for their constitution. The ratio of 
Cook appears to be the following: 
 
 There is a category of contracts that require to be constituted using 
writing in a legally prescribed form. 
 The agreement presently before the court falls into that category. It 
is irrelevant that it was contained in a compromise agreement. 
 Therefore, the agreement presently before the court requires to be 
constituted using writing. 
 
This reasoning applies just as much to the alleged agreement DWS v RMS 




It is clear enough that a compromise agreement does not have to be in 
writing simply because it concerns land in some way, any more than that 
is the case with contracts generally. Equally, though, it has been argued 
here that the same rules apply to compromise agreements as to contracts 
generally. There is no exception for compromise agreements from the 
requirements contained in the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 
1995. If a particular obligation requires writing, that is as much true in 
compromise agreements as it is elsewhere. Accordingly, if a compromise 
agreement is to create an obligation to transfer ownership of land, that 
obligation will only be validly constituted if it is created in writing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
